Hindsight, tradition and national style in the pre-history of the Leyden Jar by Bycroft, Michael
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript version: Published Version 
The version presented in WRAP is the published version (Version of Record). 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/115283                            
 
How to cite: 
The repository item page linked to above, will contain details on accessing citation guidance 
from the publisher. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
F
O
C
U
SHindsight, Tradition, and National Styles
in the Prehistory of the Leyden JarMichael Bycroft, University of WarwickAbstract: The Leyden jar surprised natural philosophers when it was invented in 1746
because it showed the paradoxical behavior of glass. But similar experiments had been
done before, such as those by the Frenchman Charles Dufay. Why was Dufay oblivious
to the paradox? The answer involves three kinds of historical explanation that are con-
troversial but fruitful: hindsight, tradition, and national styles.Take a glass jar, fill it with water, and insert a metal rod in its mouth. Holding the jar in onehand, connect the rod to a source of static electricity. Now touch the metal rod with your
free hand. The result, as a range of European natural philosophers discovered in 1746, is a nasty
shock.
The shock was intellectual as well as physical. At first, the glass walls of the jar impeded
the flow of electrical matter, confining it to the jar; then, all of a sudden, the electrical matter
shot through the glass walls and into the body of the experimenter. The glass jar both did, and
did not, transmit electrical matter. How could this be? The eighteenth-century answer, provided
by Benjamin Franklin and others, was that the forces exerted by electrical matter can exist in
places where the electrical matter does not. The forces pass through glass while the matter stays
put. To cut a long story short, the Leyden experiment helps to explain the formation of the con-
cept of electric charge.
This story is a little too short, however. The paradoxical behavior of electrical materials had
been known for more than a decade before the Leyden experiment arrived on the scene. Some-
time around 1730, the French aristocrat Charles Dufay held a metal plate between a charged
glass tube and pieces of gold leaf. The gold leaf did not move. The electrical matter must have
been blocked by the metal plate. Yet Dufay also had great trouble charging a piece of glass that
stood on a metal stand. The electrical matter seemed to be lost through the metal stand. Met-
als both did, and did not, transmit electrical matter. Dufay reported these experiments to the
Paris Academy of Sciences in 1733. Yet he did not find anything paradoxical about them.
Why?Michael Bycroft is Assistant Professor of the History of Science and Technology at the University of Warwick. He is coeditor,
with Sven Dupré, of Gems in the Early Modern World: Materials, Knowledge, and Global Trade, 1450–1800 (Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2019), and is writing a monograph on the role of precious stones in the physical sciences in early modern Europe. He re-
ceived his Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge in 2013 before taking up postdoctoral positions at the Max Planck Institute
for the History of Science and the University of Warwick. Humanities Building, CV4 7AL Coventry, Warwickshire, United King-
dom; M.Bycroft@warwick.ac.uk.
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318 Michael Bycroft The Prehistory of the Leyden JarThe answer to this question involves an exotic theory of electricity, a collection of precious
stones, and a quirk of French science. The prehistory of the Leyden jar also involves three
kinds of historical explanation that are controversial but fruitful: hindsight, tradition, and na-
tional styles.1
HINDS IGHT
The reason Dufay did not see a paradox in the behavior of metals is that his theory of electric-
ity was not the same as ours. The phrases in italics above—“blocked by the metal plate,” “lost
through the metal stand”—are not Dufay’s. They are natural phrases for us to use because the
fundamental distinction we make between electrical materials is between “conductors” and
“insulators,” between materials that give free passage to electricity and those that do not. Hence
the paradox: the metal stand gives free passage but the metal plate does not. For Dufay, how-
ever, the fundamental contrast was between “contractors” and “noncontractors,” between ma-
terials that receive a lot of electricity from charged bodies and those that receive little. He pic-
tured metals as sponges, objects that soak up a great deal of electricity and hold it in place. On
this theory, the paradox vanishes. The metal plate soaks up electrical matter that would other-
wise be available to move the gold leaf. The metal stand behaves in exactly the same way: it
soaks up electrical matter that would otherwise fill the piece of amber sitting on it. Dufay did
not see a paradox in the behavior of metals because he thought of metals as sponges for elec-
tricity, not as conduits of electricity.
This explanation will look fishy to some readers of this journal. Even the question—Why
did Dufay fail to notice that metals behave paradoxically?—may seem suspect. One might as
well ask why Aristotle failed to articulate the law of rectilinear inertia or why there was no sci-
entific revolution in China in the seventeenth century. Historians of science asked such ques-
tions in the past, the argument goes, but right-thinking historians no longer do.
I’m not so sure. In everyday life, we are perfectly capable of asking, and answering, ques-
tions about what did not happen. Why did my house not burn down today? Because the fire
alarm alerted me to the smoke from the frying pan. Why did the student fail to hand in the as-
signment on time? Because he slept through his alarm (or so he says). We are capable of ex-
plaining even the most improbable nonevents. There are many reasons why I have not traveled
to the center of the Sun: the dearth of commercial spaceflight, my modest personal fortune, the
physiological challenges of living in extreme temperatures, and so on.
Why then are historians of science wary of asking why such-and-such an event did not hap-
pen? Partly, I suspect, because we often deal with mental events. Nonevents are already ethe-
real entities; nonevents that take place only in the mind are positively ghostly. But the bigger
worry is hindsight. We are reluctant to ask why Aristotle did not invent inertia because inertia
eventually was invented, by Descartes and company, and we are wary of projecting Descartes’s
ideas on Aristotle. If we have Descartes on our minds when we think about Aristotle, the worry
goes, we are bound to conflate the two. And if we ask why Aristotle was not Descartes, we are
halfway to saying that Aristotle should have been Descartes. Our language betrays us: the ques-
tion “Why did Aristotle fail to invent inertia?” implies that Aristotle failed whereas Descartes
succeeded.
These worries are well meaning but spurious. We are perfectly capable of holding the ideas
“Aristotle” and “Plato” in our minds without conflating the two. We are equally capable of saying1 The empirical part of this essay is based on Michael Bycroft, “Physics and Natural History in the Eighteenth Century: The Case
of Charles Dufay” (Ph.D. diss., Univ. Cambridge, 2013); and Bycroft, “Experiments on Collections at the Royal Society of Lon-
don and the Paris Academy of Sciences, 1660–1740,” in Instituting the Sciences in Early Modern Europe, ed. Giulia Giannini
and Mordechai Feingold (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming in 2019).
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born in Athens.” We do not suddenly lose these capacities when we bring Descartes and inertia
into the picture. Even if we did lose them, the solution would not be to keep Descartes and
inertia out of the picture but to become more disciplined—by phrasing our questions in neu-
tral language, for example. If hindsight is rose-tinted, the solution is to take off the rose-tinted
glasses, not to shut our eyes.
TRADIT ION
Why did Dufay develop the contraction theory, the theory that metals behave like sponges?
Because, I suggest, he was part of a tradition of material-driven experimentation that had flour-
ished at the Paris Academy of Sciences since the 1660s. It is easy to be skeptical about tra-
ditions, those vague but weighty entities that historians sometimes invoke to explain the behav-
ior of individuals and institutions. Traditions may seem as fanciful as Zeitgeister, dialectics, and
arcs of history bending toward justice. But traditions can explain things if we are precise about
what the tradition is and what it explains.
The French tradition I have in mind was exemplified in the plant project, a decades-long
attempt to identify the medically useful substances in plants. The project had three elements:
a large collection of plants, most of them grown on a plot created for the purpose at the Jardin
du Roi; a uniform experimental procedure, in which the same set of macerations and distilla-
tions was applied to each plant, mostly at the academy’s laboratory; and an attempt to compare
the results of these trials. The aim was to come up with statements of the form “This group of
plants behaves like this, whereas this other group behaves like that.” An example: “All aromatic
plants gave an essential oil, and almost none of the other plants gave one.”
The plant project ran from 1668 to around 1700, in parallel with an analogous project on
mineral waters. After 1700, the naturalist René Réaumur applied the same procedure to min-
erals. Dufay followed suit in the 1720s and 1730s. He built up a large collection of precious
stones and experimented furiously upon them. The results appeared in papers on phosphores-
cence, artificial gems, double refraction—and electricity. It was to gems that Dufay first applied
his basic distinction between bodies that are easy to electrify by friction (jaspers, opaque agates,
the hardest marbles) and those that are hard to electrify (building stones). It was Dufay’s habit
of systematically testing different materials, and comparing their behavior, that led him to his
fundamental theory about contraction—that is, that the bodies that are easiest to electrify by
friction are the least apt to contract electricity from a second body. Electrics behave like this,
nonelectrics like that.
How does the tradition explain the theory? Partly through a chain of smaller explanations:
Dufay experimented like this because Réaumur did; Réaumur did because his predecessors
had done so. Partly, also, through shared circumstances, which help to explain why the tradi-
tion persisted. The plant project was possible because the academicians had access to the plants
at the royal garden; Réaumur’s mineral project was possible because he, too, had access to
Crown resources—namely, the minerals sent to Paris at the request of the regent of France.
Dufay’s entry into the tradition is also part of the explanation, though the lines of causation are
complicated. Did Dufay enter the academy because he was good at experimenting on materi-
als? Or was he good at experimenting on materials because he entered the academy? There
is something to be said for both answers. Dufay entered the academy, in part, because he had
already been doing material-driven experiments on Chinese lacquer, experiments that would
have appealed to Réaumur. At the same time, being in the academy brought him closer to Ré-
aumur, whose experiments on gems, phosphors, and electricity anticipated Dufay’s own. The
tradition, embodied in Réaumur, pushed Dufay in certain directions. And it kept pushing as
Dufay went along—insights from Réaumur can be found in several of Dufay’s electrical papers.This content downloaded from 137.205.202.079 on May 31, 2019 01:45:29 AM
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320 Michael Bycroft The Prehistory of the Leyden JarTraditions are suspect because, like gases, they are diffuse and invisible. But, also like gases,
they are made up of myriad small interactions that make a difference in the aggregate.
NATIONAL STYLES
Dufay came up with the contraction theory partly because he was French. This may not
sound like a very promising explanation, especially in 2019, when historians are less interested in
nations than in the networks that joined nations together. But consider the following.
First, there is a long and distinguished tradition of contrasting the French and English scien-
tific styles in the decades around 1700. Voltaire, Pierre Duhem, Thomas Kuhn, Lorraine Daston,
Peter Dear, and Larry Holmes are all part of this tradition.
Next, there were no English equivalents to the projects on plants, mineral waters, and min-
erals that I have described. Consider minerals. There were large mineral collections in England
in this period, notably those of John Woodward and Hans Sloane. There were also many no-
table experimenters. But where is the English Réaumur, the person who took a large mineral
collection and did systematic trials on each of the items therein? Not Robert Hooke, Isaac New-
ton, Stephen Gray, or Francis Hauksbee, who all used minerals at one point or another but
not in the way Réaumur and Dufay did. It is true that Robert Boyle did a great many trials on
precious stones. But he never took all his gems and did the same thing to each one. Instead,
he used each gem as and when it suited whatever argument he wished to make at the time.
This difference is not a coincidence. It can be explained by well-documented differences
between the Academy of Sciences and the Royal Society. The former was under direct royal
control, meaning that the academicians had access to large, stable, disposable collections, such
as the plants at the king’s garden and the minerals collected by the regent. The plant proj-
ect relied on the long-term collaboration of gardeners, naturalists, and chemists, a feat that
was harder to achieve at the Royal Society, with its dispersed and fluctuating membership. And
the academy’s sponsors rewarded utility more than spectacle, whereas the society’s sponsors
had the opposite preference. Francis Hauksbee would not have survived for long as the Royal
Society’s curator of experiments if he had nothing to entertain the Fellows but one distilled plant
after another.
The fourth consideration is Dufay’s work on electricity. Dufay was an excellent networker.
He traveled to London twice in the 1730s. He corresponded with the Englishmen Hans Sloane
and Granville Wheler. He kept abreast of the electrical experiments of his English counterpart
Stephen Gray, and he summarized his own findings in English in the Philosophical Transac-
tions. Yet despite all this border-crossing, his papers on electricity are cut from a different cloth
than Gray’s or Hauksbee’s. To put it simply: Dufay focused on materials, the Englishmen on
instruments. Gray was interested in conductors because they sent electricity over long distances,
Dufay because they allowed him to compare the behavior of metal wires, wood sticks, and
lines of thread. Hauksbee’s experiments on electricity were driven by the electrostatic gener-
ator and the air-pump, Dufay’s by pieces of amber, glass, wood, metal, and rock crystal. When
Hauksbee filled a glass tube with sand, he saw the sand as a mechanical device for excluding air
from the tube. When Dufay replicated this experiment, he saw the sand as a material to be com-
pared to other materials, such as water and bran. The flow of people and texts across the Chan-
nel did not end the distinctiveness of French science but put it into sharp relief. If Dufay
had been born in London, not Paris, would he have come up with the contraction theory?
Maybe, but I doubt it. National styles, like traditions and hindsight, still have something to
offer the historian of science who is interested in explanation.This content downloaded from 137.205.202.079 on May 31, 2019 01:45:29 AM
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